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COMMENT
BACK IN THE SADDLE* AGAIN:
BUT WHICH WAY Do WE Go
FROM HERE?
A VIEW OF AGENCY SUGGESTIONS FOR
SYSTEMIC RISK REGULATION
INTRODUCTION
When you hear the term "systemic risk,"' what is the first thing
that pops into your mind? Do you think about a "run on the bank"?
The subprime mortgage crisis? The collapse of Bear Steams or
Lehman Brothers? Bernie Madoff? All of these are elements of
systemic risk, and presently there is no governing body that has the
ability to regulate these kinds of risks on a grand scale.
Attempts to define systemic risk have led to confusion and
uncertainty. Alan Greenspan acknowledged this uncertainty as he
remarked: "It is generally agreed that systemic risk represents a
propensity for some sort of significant financial system disruption ...
. [O]ne observer might use the term 'market failure' to describe what
another would deem to have been a market outcome that was natural
and healthy, even if harsh."2 Through this definition and his later
AEROSMrrH, Back in the Saddle, on ROCKS (Columbia Records 1976).
See, e.g., Systemic Risk: Examining Regulators' Ability to Respond to Threats to the
Financial System: Hearing before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. (2007), available
at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110.house hearings&docid=f:3
9903.pdf (discussing the existing regulatory structure and its ability to respond to systemic risk);
Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Systemic Risk and Regulation (Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr.
Working Paper No. 95-24, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=787797 (discussing
systemic risk and the transfer of risk from banking to insurance).
2 George G. Kaufman, Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and Bank Regulation, 16 CATO J.
17, 21 n.5 (1996) (quoting Alan Greenspan, Remarks at a Conference on Risk Measurement and
Systemic Risk, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Nov. 16, 1995)), available
at http://www.cato.org/pubs/joumalcjl6nl/cj 16nl-2.pdf.
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statements, Greenspan has acknowledged that the very definition of
systemic risk is "still somewhat unsettled."
Even honest attempts to analyze all the available definitions of
systemic risk may not lead to a concrete understanding of the subject.
However, the various definitions4 share at least one basic element-
systemic risk involves a trigger event that leads to a chain reaction of
negative effects.5 The Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"), Mary L. Schapiro, provided information about
systemic risk in a recent speech. Chairman Schapiro stated that "there
are two different kinds of 'systemic risk': (1) the risk of sudden,
near-term systemic seizures or cascading failures and (2) the
longer-term risk that our system will unintentionally favor large
systemically important institutions over smaller, more nimble
competitors, reducing the system's ability to innovate and adapt to
change."6 With the various definitions for systemic risk, and the
difficulty in truly understanding systemic risk, the regulation
challenge is even more pronounced.
3 Id.
Systemic risk has been defined as "the probability that cumulative losses will occur
from an event that ignites a series of successive losses along a . .. system." Id. at 20. It has also
been defined as "the potential for a modest economic shock to induce substantial volatility in
asset prices, significant reductions in corporate liquidity, potential bankruptcies and efficiency
losses." Paul Kupiec & David Nickerson, Assessing Systemic Risk Exposure from Banks and
GSEs Under Alternative Approaches to Capital Regulation, 28 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 123,
123 (2004). The Commodity Futures Trading Commission defines systemic risk as the risk "that
a default by one market participant will have repercussions on other participants due to the
interlocking nature of financial markets. For example, Customer A's default in X market may
affect Intermediary B's ability to fulfill its obligations in Markets X, Y, and Z." U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, The CFTC Glossary: A Guide to the Language of the
Futures Industry, http://www.cftc.gov/educationcenter/glossary/glossary-s.html (last visited Jan.
22, 2010). The Financial System Stabilization and Reform Act of 2009 defines systemic risk as
"the risk that a product or activity that is financial in nature, or that a default by a financial
institution, will produce failures of, or significant losses to, other financial institutions, resulting
in substantial increases in the cost of capital or substantial decreases in the availability of
capital, or substantial financial market price volatility." H.R. 1754, 111th Cong. § 101(8)
(2009). Steven Schwarcz also attempts to define systemic risk as "risk that [] an economic shock
such as market or institutional failure triggers . . . either [] the failure of a chain of markets or
institutions or [] a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, [] resulting in increase in
the cost of capital or decreases in its availability . . . ." Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97
GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008).
5 See Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 199 (describing the "classic example" of systemic risk as
a chain reaction of negative effects among "closely intertwined" banks, such as that which
occurred at the outset of the Great Depression); id. at 200-04 (describing another chain reaction
of negative effects resulting from systemic risk problems arising out of capital markets).
6 Testimony Concerning Regulation of Systemic Risk: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Illth Cong. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Schapiro Testimony]
(testimony of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC), available at http://banking.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore-id=4c3al4d4-ddee-4873-b56d-c7313cd55
398.
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This Comment explores various agency proposals for establishing
some kind of systemic risk regulation with a single entity regulator.
According to Chairman Schapiro there are two different types of
systemic risk regulation: "(1) the traditional oversight, regulation,
market transparency and enforcement provided by primary regulators
that helps keep systemic risk from developing in the first place and
(2) the new 'macro-prudential' regulation designed to identify and
minimize systemic risk if it does [develop]."7 The agency reports
discussed throughout this Comment will focus on systemic risk
regulation most similar to the types described by Chairman Schapiro.
Part I will provide a background picture of systemic risk and outline
the need for this kind of regulation. Part II will examine and compare
the four main proposals. Finally, Part II will suggest future steps the
government can take to establish a systemic risk regulator that
prevents future financial meltdowns.
I. BACKGROUND
A. General Background
Following the financial collapse of 2008, the relevant agencies'
main concern revolved around the means of protecting the financial
systems from systemic risk. This same financial crisis also paved the
way for the idea of a systemic risk regulator.9 The gaps in the
7 Id.
8 The relevant agencies here are the Department of the Treasury, the Investment
Company Institute, and the Group of Thirty, each of which prepared a report regarding future
management of systemic risk. See infra notes 14, 16, 32-33 and accompanying text.
9 In a recent article, Timothy Geithner and Lawrence Summers observed the following:
Th[e] current financial crisis had many causes. It had its roots in the global
imbalance in saving and consumption, in the widespread use of poorly understood
financial instruments, in shortsightedness and excessive leverage at financial
institutions. But it was also the product of basic failures in financial supervision and
regulation.
Timothy Geithner & Lawrence Summers, A New Financial Foundation, WASH. POST, June 15,
2009, at A15. Although Bernard L. Madoff was not the sole reason for the financial crisis of
2008, his ponzi scheme, which defrauded investors out of $65 billion over twenty years, gained
the attention of the masses. See Diana B. Henriques, $3 Billion in Losses to Madoff
Documented, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2009, at B3.
During that twenty-year period, Madoff had been in the crosshairs of the Securities and
Exchange Commission several different times. "Between June 1992 and December 2008 when
Madoff confessed, the SEC received six substantive complaints that raised significant red flags
concerning Madoffs [sic] hedge fund operations that should have led to questions about whether
Madoff was actually engaged in trading." Josh Hamilton, SEC Inspector General Faults Madoff
Enforcement, Particularly Failure to Verify Through Independent Third Parties, CCH FIN.
CRISIS NEWS CTR., Sept. 3, 2009, http://www.financialcrisisupdate.com/2009/09/sec-inspector
-general-faults-madoff-enforcement-particularly-failure-to-verify-through-independent-t.html.
The SEC conducted a number of investigations and examinations, but nothing came from those
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financial system presented themselves in full force when the crisis
began, at which point the flaws in the system became apparent to
financial reformers.'o According to Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S.
Bernanke, the present financial crisis is the worst since the Great
Depression, and it has "precipitated a sharp downturn in the global
economy."" In discussing potential causes of the crisis, Bernanke
further stated that the downturn occurred, at least in part, due to the
fact that "risk-management systems of the private sector and
government oversight of the financial sector . .. failed to ensure that
the inrush of capital was prudently invested, a failure that has led to a
powerful reversal in investor sentiment and a seizing up of credit
markets."' 2
The idea behind a systemic risk regulator is to have a financial
system in which one group has the big picture of the entire industry,
instead of the less advantageous scheme of compartmentalized
regulation by single groups that only see what is within their
regulatory boundaries.' 3 In the present financial system, there is not a
single regulatory body with complete oversight. Instead, the system is
broken down into regulators for "segregated functional lines of
financial services." 4 Because of this segregated regulation there are
many problems with the system, the most noteworthy being that "no
single regulator possesses all of the information and authority
necessary to monitor systemic risk, or the potential that events
associated with financial institutions may trigger broad dislocation or
a series of defaults that affect the financial system so significantly that
the real economy is adversely affected."15  The need for an
inquiries-not until the scheme had run its course and Madoff confessed in December 2008,
which landed him with a 150-year prison sentence in June 2009. See David Stout, Report
Details How Madof's Web Ensnared S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2009, at Bl. Had systemic
risk regulations been in place from a central point, it is unclear whether or not the Madoff
scandal would have spread just as far as it did.
10 In a speech on March 10, 2009, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke stated that,
because the goal of any systemic risk authority is to have a broader view of the financial system,
reliance on the present system is insufficient because of its decentralized nature. See Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Financial Reform to Address Systemic Risk, Speech at the
Council on Foreign Relations, Washington D.C. (Mar. 10, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke200903 10a.htm).
I 2 Id.
12 Id.
13 The Federal Reserve has been singled out as a potential candidate for an agency
conversion to the systemic risk regulator. See, e.g., Kara Scannell, Frank Backs Regulator for
Systemic Risk, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2009, at C3 (stating that oversight for systemic risks could
be given to the Federal Reserve).
14 DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY
STRUCTURE 4 (2008) [hereinafter TREASURY BLUEPRINT], http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
reports/Blueprint.pdf.
15 Id.
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overarching regulatory body is important so that the industry as a
whole is properly managed and consumers are adequately protected.' 6
Such a regulatory body could effectively gauge all risk and instill
greater regulation on those institutions in which inherent risk is high
and whose failure would be catastrophic. 7  Unfortunately, no
institution in the present regulatory scheme allows for such an
overarching view of the entire financial system.
B. The Need for Change
The need for change in the existing system arises because the
present regulatory system is based on a seventy-year-old structure.!8
The system evolved in response to a series of financial crises ranging
from the late 1800s to the mid-1900s.' 9 The problem with the present
regulatory framework is that maturing foreign markets have the
ability to "alternate sources of capital and financial innovation in a
more efficient and modem regulatory system,"20 thereby leaving the
U.S. system struggling to find a way to continue to compete with the
flexible and ever-changing global markets. With the continuous
evolution of the financial markets, reform is inevitable if the U.S.
wants to remain in competition with the rest of the world. 21 The
growing inability to keep pace has not only stretched the system, but
has also permitted the infiltration of financial crises into the system.22
16 Consumer protection is a very important part of systemic risk. At the present the key
policies behind regulation include maintaining not only financial stability, but also the safety of
deposits, efficiency within the financial system and protecting consumers. Id. at 42. The
consumer protections that regulations currently attempt to regulate include fraud and abuse, but
after the Madoff scheme, it was widely recognized that present attempts to protect consumers
were not adequate. See generally id. at 42-44; DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL
REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND
REGULATION 55-75 (2009) [hereinafter TREASURY NEW FOUNDATION], http://www.financial
stability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport-web.pdf.
17 See generally TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 14, at 4.
Is See id. at 2 (noting that "for the most part the underlying [regulatory] structure
resembles what existed in the 1930s").
19 See id. First, the national bank charter was established in 1863 during the Civil War.
Second, the Federal Reserve System was established, in 1913 the Federal Reserve System was
established as a result of financial instability. Third, during the Great Depression, the
government established the federal deposit insurance system to respond to the financial crisis of
the time. Id.
2 Id. The ability of the foreign markets to adjust to changing financial products allows
them to more easily brand new financial products. With advances in technology and relatively
new financial regulations, foreign markets are not bound to an inflexible regulatory structure
like the United States. While the present United States structure has historically done quite well,
the changing global financial system and the recent financial crisis struck a chord and made it
clear that regulatory changes must happen if the United States is to continue in a prominent
position within the global financial markets. Id. at 2-3.
21 See id. at 4.
22 See id. The present regulatory system, which maintains separate regulatory structures
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The present regulatory structure focuses on a functional approach.
A functional approach means that the regulatory structure of the U.S.
financial system is separated according to regulatory function
including securities, futures, insurance and banking,23 preventing any
single regulator from comprehensively monitoring systemic risk.
Furthermore, "the inability of any regulator to take coordinated action
throughout the financial system makes it more difficult to address
problems related to financial market stability."25 Not only does the
lack of a central regulatory figure hamper efforts to monitor the
system and keep systemic risk at bay, but it also opens the door for
26jurisdictional disputes. These disputes can hinder the introduction of
new products and compel movement of financial products to offshore
financial centers, while also slowing innovation.27
Yet another reason for reforming the regulatory system and
moving toward one with a central regulatory figure comes from the
fact that "many aspects of financial regulation and consumer
protection regulation have common themes."28 Providing financial
strength and the ability to meet financial obligations are the most
important functions of the regulatory framework. After all, "money
makes the world go round." 29 Without financial integrity and strong
financial regulations a nation simply cannot survive.30 So even if the
terms of the regulations differ, the underlying purpose remains the
same.
depending on the financial service involved, does not work well with market developments
because of the level of segregation between the regulators. Id.
Recall Chairman Schapiro's definition of systemic risk, which emphasized the longer-term
risk of favoring larger institutions (like institutional investors) that do not have the ability to
adapt to changing conditions. Because of the way the system has been structured, the large
institutions were favored and the system did not adapt itself to the possibility of systemic failure
when those large institutions began to falter. In order to remain competitive in the world
markets, the regulatory structure in the United States has to find a way to innovate and adapt to
change. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
2 TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 14, at 4.
24 Id.
2 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 5.
2 JOHN KANDER & FRED EBB, Money Money, on CABARET (Hip-O Records 1996)
(1972).
3 See CNN.com, Q&A: Greece's Financial Crisis Explained, http://www.cnn.com/2010/
business/02/10/greek.debt.qanda/index.html (last visited March 25, 2010). Greece's financial
problems, which were systemic, evolved from "unrestrained spending, cheap lending, and
failure to implement financial reforms." Id. (emphasis added). Greece is a prime example why
financial strength through regulations and reforms are an integral part of keeping a country
afloat.
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HI. PROPOSAL SOURCES
This section will not only provide the main points of each
agency report, but will also address the best anticipated solutions to
protect against systemic risk. The present regulatory system faces
many challenges, and several agency proposals have sought to
address them. The sources include the following: (1) The Department
of the Treasury Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory
Structure31 ("Treasury Blueprint"); (2) the Group of Thirty's
"Financial Reform: A Framework for Financial Stability" 32 ("Group
30 Framework"); (3) the Investment Company Institute's "Financial
Services Regulatory Reform"3 3 ("ICI Report"); and (4) The
Department of the Treasury's "Financial Regulatory Reform: A New
Foundation-Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation" 34
("New Foundation Report").
A. Treasury Blueprint
"[Flinancial institutions serve a vitally important function in the
U.S. economy by allowing capital to seek out its most productive uses
in an efficient matter." 35 The economic significance of the financial
system led the Department of the Treasury to come up with the
Treasury Blueprint. Of the four proposals, the Treasury Blueprint
provides the most detailed information regarding several aspects of
regulatory reform. First, the Treasury Blueprint focuses on the need
for change in the existing system.36  Second, it provides
recommendations based on three different timeframes: (1) short term;
(2) intermediate term; and (3) optimal regulatory structure.37 Within
the optimal regulatory structure, the Treasury Blueprint mentions two
different regulatory structures similar to systemic risk regulators: (1) a
market stability regulator; and (2) a prudential financial regulator.38
3' TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 14.
32 GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY
(2009) [hereinafter THIRTY FRAMEWORK], http://www.group30.org/pubs/reformreport.pdf.
3 INv. Co. INsT., FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATORY REFORM: DISCUSSION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2009) [hereinafter ICI REFORM], http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr-09-reg
reform.pdf.
3 TREASURY NEW FOUNDATION, supra note 16.
3 TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 14, at 1.
3 See id. at 3-5 (summarizing the need for review of the current regulatory system).
3 See id. at 5-21 (highlighting the possible short- and intermediate-term changes to the
regulatory system, as well as the optimal regulatory structure for the long-term).
38 See id. at 15-19.
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1. Recommendations for the Regulatory Framework
The Treasury Blueprint focuses on three different
recommendations for the system.39 First, in the short term, the
Treasury Blueprint proposes making the President's Working Group
on Financial Markets ("Working Group") an interim systemic risk
regulator." The Working Group was established in 1988 by
Executive Order 12631 following the 1987 stock market decline, and
includes the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") and Commodities Futures Trading
Commission ("CFTC") department heads.41 As a short-term
coordinator, the Working Group has the ability to promote
coordination and communication for financial policy.4 2 In order to
make the Working Group functional in this role, the Treasury
Blueprint advocates the following updates to the Executive Order:
(1) maintaining a broader focus on the financial sector, rather than
solely concentrating on the financial markets; (2) striving to alleviate
systemic risk to the financial system, improve market integrity,
advocate consumer protections, and reinforce the market's ability to
compete-all through improved communication and coordination
among agencies; (3) expanding the Working Group's membership to
include the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Office of Thrift Supervision;
and (4) issuing reports without requiring the approval of the White
House.43
This kind of systemic risk regulation would abide by Chairman
Schapiro's "macro-prudential" regulation, since it is designed to
identify and minimize systemic risk." Macro-prudential regulation,
according to Chairman Schapiro, includes not only a systemic risk
regulator that would have unfettered access to market-wide
information, but also an oversight council, which would complement
the systemic risk regulator by providing additional eyes on the issues
and the necessary tools to deal with problems that arise.4 5 The
3 See id. at 5-22. The Treasury Blueprint maintains a broader focus than what is covered
here, but the recommendations relative to mortgages, insurance, banking charters, and
settlement systems are not included are not relevant for the purposes of this Comment.
40 Id. at 75.
41 Id. at 75. The Working Group's objective was to "report on the major issues raised by
[the] stock market decline and on actions to enhance market integrity and maintain investor
confidence." Id.
42 Id. at 76.
43 Id. at 76-77.
44 See id.; see also Schapiro Testimony, supra note 6.
4s See Schapiro Testimony, supra note 6.
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Treasury Blueprint updates to the Executive Order would fulfill both
measures of Chairman Schapiro's idea of macro-prudential regulation
by furnishing market-wide information to a singular body and
providing it with the tools necessary to maintain market integrity.
Second, in the intermediate term, the Treasury Blueprint speaks to
merging the SEC with the CFTC.46 The former split between the SEC
and the CFTC was understandable when the markets were truly
distinct, but that is simply not the case with the present-day markets.
As markets converge with the passage of time, a unification of the
oversight and regulatory powers of the SEC and the CFTC makes
sense. 47
Merging the regulatory systems allows for development of
overarching regulatory principles that focus on systemic risk and
investor protection.48 With the advent of complex financial
instruments and commodities no longer having a singular agricultural
focus, the present system of futures and securities is no longer black
and white.4 9 As a result of the changing complexities of the financial
markets, "U]urisdictional disputes have ensued as the increasing
complexity and hybridization of financial products have made the
'definitional' determination of agency jurisdiction .. . increasingly
problematic."so While there have been attempts to defuse the
problems between the SEC and the CFTC,5' the "lack of coordination
between the futures and securities markets . . . may contribute to
increased market volatility and may impair market participants'
ability to accurately estimate their risk exposure." 5 2 While a merger of
46 See TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 14, at 115-18.
47 This kind of change is in line with Chairman Schapiro's systemic risk regulation of the
traditional oversight by primary regulators with the intent to keep systemic risk from surfacing
in the first place. See Schapiro Testimony, supra note 6.
4 See TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 14, at 108-09.
49 See id. at 106.
5o Id. at 107. The jurisdictional disputes have "hindered innovation, limited investor
choice, harmed investor protection, and encouraged product innovators and their consumers to
seek out other, more integrated international markets, engage in regulatory arbitrage, or evade
regulatory oversight altogether." Id.
s' Id. at 108-09. The storm between the SEC and CFTC began as early as 1975 with the
challenge over which agency had regulatory control over government securities under the
Government National Mortgage Association. Id. at 107. These securities initially fell under
control of the CFTC as commodities, but that changed in 1981 when options for the securities
started trading on the Chicago Board Options Exchange. Id. Courts have attempted to draw the
lines between these agencies, but in the process of providing clarifications, product development
has either been completely shut out or heavily handicapped. Id at 108. Another attempt at
correcting the problems between these agencies came in the form of the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act, which ultimately required cooperation between the agencies. Id. But
ultimately, agreement between the agencies on simple matters, like margin requirements, has
been elusive and effectively has limited financial product innovation in the U.S. market. Id.
52 Id. at 109.
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the two regulatory agencies would require an act of Congress, the
Treasury Blueprint recommends at least merging the agency
philosophies, so as to "harmonize futures and securities statutes and
regulations."53 The Treasury Blueprint's second recommendation is
pivotal in order to allow financial innovation within U.S. financial
markets, enhanced disclosures to ensure that customers fully
understand their risks and rewards, and ultimately to allow the
financial markets to be flexible in accord with the changing world
markets.
In its third recommendation, Treasury Blueprint proposes an
optimal regulatory structure that focuses on an objectives-based form
of regulation.5 4 In this structure, the regulatory responsibilities with
"natural synergies" are subject to consolidation, which paves the
way for systemic risk regulators-a central, uniform regulatory body,
with defined regulatory lines for three types of systemic risk
regulators-whose regulatory responsibilities are no longer split
between agencies. 6 The Treasury Blueprint provides for three distinct
regulators, all having specific focal points within financial
institutions: (1) a market stability regulator; (2) a prudential financial
regulator; and (3) a business conduct regulator.57
2. Objectives-Based Regulation
First, a market stability regulator's sole focus would be the broad
issues that can impact market stability across all types of financial
institutions. The market stability regulator is responsible "for overall
conditions of financial market stability that could impact the real
5 Id. at 115. The Treasury Blueprint assumes that a "merger will enhance investor
protection, market integrity, market and product innovation, industry competitiveness, and
international regulatory dialogue." Id.
5 See id. at 142-46. The Treasury Blueprint provides that certain key objectives would
guide regulation: "market stability regulation, prudential financial regulation, and business
conduct regulation . . . ." Id. at 142.
5 Id. Such consolidation would allow the regulations within "one regulatory body ... to
focus on common elements of risk management across financial institutions . . . ." Id. By
allowing these elements to be the focus of one regulatory body, that body can better focus on
key pressure points within the market.
56 Id. at 143-46. The Treasury Blueprint, instead of focusing on a singular systemic risk
regulator like Chairman Schapiro suggested, divides the responsibility of a systemic risk
regulator in accordance with natural synergies. Id. at 143. The Treasury Blueprint seeks to
create three different regulators by providing very clear dividing lines for those regulators. Id.
First, a market stability regulator that takes on the task of looking after financial market
conditions that could ultimately cause an impact on the economy as a whole. Id. at 144. Second,
a prudential financial regulator, which focuses its attention on the government guarantees, like
federal deposit insurance. Id. Third, a business conduct regulator, which focuses on consumer
protections to promote full disclosure and awareness. Id
5 See id. at 137-38.
58 See id. at 144, 146-56.
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economy." 59 Under this plan, the Federal Reserve assumes the role of
market stability regulator since it is already in the role to promote
"overall macroeconomic stability . . . ."60 The Treasury Blueprint
foresees this plan as one where the stability would be ensured through
monetary policy and liquidity provisions. 6 1 The plan also proposes
that the Federal Reserve have broad powers focusing on the overall
financial system.62
In the interests of overall financial market stability, the Treasury
Blueprint recommends that the Federal Reserve have the
responsibility and authority to gather appropriate information,
disclose information, collaborate among regulators on rule drafting,
and take necessary corrective actions to prevent future collapse or
catastrophe.6 3 The Treasury Blueprint emphasizes that enhanced
regulatory authority is a prerequisite in dealing with systemic risk.&6
The only way to make the Federal Reserve function appropriately as a
market stability regulator is to require disclosure of detailed
information on the existing regulated financial institutions, share
financial reports to analyze impact and market stability, and allow the
Federal Reserve to not only mandate other public disclosures, but also
provide input into the development of regulatory policy.65
Second, a prudential financial regulator would be housed within a
single regulatory body (like the merged SEC/CFTC) and its sole
focus would be the common elements of risk management across all
financial institutions.6 6 This regulator would be in place to focus on
financial institutions with associated explicit government
guarantees. 67 This focus is important because "explicit government
5 Id. at 137.
6 Id. at 137, 146. Within this role, the Federal Reserve would not only be responsible for
continuing to formulate monetary policy, but would also be a lender of last resort, since
"[p]rudent use of a lender of last resort authority can help to preserve market stability in certain
cases ..... Id. at 147.
61 See id. at 137, 144. Changes in monetary policy include adjustments to the discount rate
to encourage spending or control inflation. Liquidity provisions include the lender of last resort
feature, which is meant to make "short-term credit available" and keep money circulating and
the economy stimulated. Id. at 153.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 144.
4 Id. at 15. Additionally, the Treasury Blueprint recognizes that "the [President's
Working Group], the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the [Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency] have previously stated that market discipline is the most effective tool [against]
systemic risk." Id. at 15 n.2.
65 See id. at 15-16. The Treasury Blueprint also notes that the Federal Reserve, in the
systemic regulator capacity, should have the authority to require corrective actions if it sees a
problem coming down the pipeline. The Federal Reserve should also continue with its lender of
last resort policy to address liquidity issues and expand that fiscal safety net. See id. at 16-17.
66 See id. at 144, 157-70.
67 Id. at 137-38. The Treasury Blueprint notes that "[tihe most prominent examples of
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guarantees often erode market discipline . . . ."68 The market
discipline is eroded because when government guarantees are present,
risk no longer remains in the equation because the guarantee provides
a safety net.69 This safety net can lead to banking practices that go
against the grain, searching for the biggest profit and not necessarily
serving the needs of communities. 7 0 The Treasury Blueprint explains
that it is important to have prudential regulation, but that it should
resemble "the current regulation of insured depository institutions,
with capital adequacy requirements, investment limits, activity limits,
and direct on-site risk management supervision." 7'
Third, a business conduct regulator would primarily be responsible
for consumer protections, providing uniformity among disclosures so
that consumer awareness is elevated and uniform. 7 2 Not only does the
optimal structure provide for dedicated risk management, but it also
allows for a better focus on the financial markets as a whole because
the regulator no longer splits its focus between different concerns.
While the Treasury Blueprint did mention implementing a single
consolidated regulator-a true systemic risk regulator-the report
outlines several problems, ultimately deciding that the
objectives-based approach is a better fit.7 3 The Treasury Blueprint
discusses several benefits to having a single, consolidated regulator.74
First, there is an enhanced efficiency in combining common functions
into a single body.s Second, the approach allows for a clearer view of
overall risks to the financial system. Third, the approach avoids
issues associated with overlapping jurisdiction.7 In response to these
benefits, the Treasury Blueprint also outlines the problems with the
78
single, consolidated regulator. These problems were enough to
persuade the Treasury Blueprint to adopt the objectives-based
approach. The report first mentions the potential problem that
"housing all regulatory functions . . . in one entity may lead to
varying degrees of focus on these key functions."7 9 Second, this
government guarantees in the United States are federal deposit insurance and state-established
insurance guarantee funds." Id. at 157.
68 Id. at 144.
6 See id. at 159-64.
70 See id. at 161.
71 Id. at 158.
72 See id. at 144, 170-80.
7 See id. at 141.
74 See id.
7 See id.
76 See id.
7 See id.
7 See id.
7 See id.
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consolidated approach may actually lead to less market discipline.so
Third, this would be difficult to implement in comparison to other
jurisdictions, like the United Kingdom.8 ' Fourth, a high degree of
coordination would be required with the central bank to try and keep
things in line.82 The Treasury Blueprint's ultimate proposal focuses on
making the system work as a whole without splitting the focus
between various responsibilities.
B. Group of Thirty Framework
The Group of Thirty Framework took shape as the global financial
crisis entered its second year. The information in the report focuses
on how the financial system can change after the crisis has passed,
attempting to find ways to bring greater stability to the existing
system.83 The report focuses on a series of recommendations:
(1) eliminating the gaps and weaknesses in the coverage and
supervision of prudential regulation; (2) improving the quality and
effectiveness of prudential regulation and supervision;
(3) strengthening international policies and standards concerning risk
management and governance; and (4) increasing transparency within
the financial markets and products.8
The Group of Thirty Framework differs from the Treasury
Blueprint in that it proposes consolidated regulatory supervision.
The Group of Thirty Framework argues a consolidated approach is
essential for meeting "high and common international standards."8 6
The Group of Thirty Framework also indicates that larger banks-
those whose failure increases the chance of systemic failure-should
be limited in the amount of high-risk activities in which they can
participate. The Group of Thirty Framework further indicates that
so See id. The concern over less market discipline comes from the idea that the "same
regulator would regulate all financial institutions, whether or not they have explicit government
guarantees." Id. The government guarantees that many consumers are used to, such as federally
insured deposits, are not universal, and in fact encompass a range of explicit guarantees. Id.
Consolidating a regulator for such a non-universal system would potentially give market
participants a false sense of security with regard to the safety of their investments, ultimately
leading to a more relaxed market environment and less market discipline-the very concern
enunciated in the Treasury Blueprint. Id. at 158.
8I See id. With global financial markets, maintaining stability through regulation has
become commonplace and having regulations that are simple to implement makes it easier for
the global enterprises to know what they can or cannot do in the global financial markets.
82 See id.
83 THIRTY FRAMEWORK, supra note 32, at 7.
84 See id. at 7-8.
85 See id. at 28 (recommending that in all countries, the activities of "deposit-taking
institutions" should be subject to consolidated supervision).
86 See id.
87 See id.
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money market mutual funds wishing to "continue to offer bank-like
services, such as transaction account services [and] withdrawals on
demand . . . should be required to reorganize as special-purpose
banks, with appropriate prudential regulation . . . ."" The
framework's recommendations continue by suggesting the creation of
a national prudential regulator with the authority to require periodic
reports and public disclosures from managers of private pools of
capital, something that is not presently in place.89 These steps are all
part of a process designed to eliminate the weaknesses and gaps in the
present prudential regulation coverage.
The second recommendation involves improving the quality and
effectiveness of prudential regulation. 90 The Group of Thirty
Framework suggests removing unnecessary overlaps and gaps in the
regulatory framework in order to improve coordination, not only
between the existing regulatory bodies, but also on a grander
international scale.91 The report, like the Treasury Blueprint, proposes
that the Federal Reserve have a greater role in promoting and
maintaining financial stability. In addition, much like the Treasury
Blueprint, the Group of Thirty Framework also suggests that the
Federal Reserve continue to have emergency lending authority, but it
seeks tighter regulations for non-bank institutions.93 The Group of
Thirty Framework also favors a greater degree of international
cooperation regarding oversight of the largest international banks,
which are the banks whose failures create immense risk for more than
a single country.
The third recommendation involves strengthening the policies and
standards relating to risk management and governance.95 The Group
of Thirty Framework seeks to ensure that there are "board-level
reviews and exercises aimed at establishing the most important
parameters for setting the firm's risk tolerance and evaluating its risk
profile relative to those parameters." 96 The report also emphasizes
keeping the risk management and auditing functions "fully
8 Id. at 29.
89 See id. at 31.
9 See id. at 34.
91 See id. at 35.
9 See id. at 36 (recommending this enhanced role for central banks on an international
scale).
93 See id. at 37.
94 See id.
9 See id. at 40 ("Institutional policies and standards must be strengthened, with particular
emphasis on standards for governance, risk management, capital, and liquidity.").
9 Id. at 41.
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independent and adequately resourced" 97 within each firm, as well as
conducting periodic reviews of the firm's vulnerability to risk.9 8
The fourth and final recommendation involves making the
financial markets and products more transparent. 99 The Group of
Thirty Framework favors restoring confidence in the securitized
credit markets by holding them to "regulatory, disclosure, and
transparency standards at least comparable to those that have
historically been applied to the public securities markets."10t The
recommendation also suggests changes to the risk ratings to
accurately reflect the risk of potential valuation losses from a "full
range of potential risk factors . . . ."'o1
C. ICI Report
The ICI Report has the best structure to follow regarding systemic
risk regulators. The ICI Report recommends changes to create "a
regulatory framework that enhances regulatory efficiency, limits
duplication, closes regulatory gaps, and emphasizes the national
character of the financial services industry."l 0 2 According to the
report, the financial system is "vulnerable to risks that have the
potential to spread rapidly throughout the system and cause
significant damage." 03 The ICI Report surmises that the "future of
the [financial] industry depends on the existence of strong,
well-regulated financial institutions operating within a well-regulated
financial marketplace that will promote investor confidence, attract
global financial business and enable [the] institutions to compete
more effectively." 10 The report specifically addressed: (1) the
creation of a systemic risk regulator; (2) the benefits and drawbacks
of said regulator; and (3) the proposed responsibilities of the systemic
risk regulator. 105
9 Id.
9 Id.
9 See id. at 48 ("Financial markets and products must be made more transparent, with
better-aligned risk and prudential incentives.").
"Id. at 49.
101 Id. at 51. The full range of factors includes not just default probabilities of loss from
defaults but also liquidity and price volatility risk factors. Id.
10 ICI REFORM, supra note 33, at i. The changes suggested by the ICI Report are similar to
those made by Chairman Schapiro during her testimony before the United States Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. Chairman Schapiro wanted to minimize
systemic risk by "address[ing] structural imbalances that facilitate the development of systemic
risk by closing gaps in regulation, improving transparency and strengthening enforcement ...
[and] establish[ing] a workable, macro-prudential regulatory framework consisting of a single
Systemic Risk Regulator. . . ." Schapiro Testimony, supra note 6, at 2.
103 ICI REFORM, supra note 33, at i.
'0 Id. at 1.
1os See id. at 2-3.
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1. Creation of the Regulator
The ICI Report, like the Treasury Blueprint, suggests combining
the SEC with the CFTC for regulatory purposes.' The reasoning
behind the proposed merger mirrors that found in the Treasury
Blueprint." The ICI Report addresses the importance of having a
capital markets regulator-in addition to a systemic risk
regulator 0 8-which largely undertakes the current regulatory
responsibilities of the SEC and CFTC.1 9 The capital markets
regulator's responsibilities would include overseeing money market
funds,no and it would have the authority to harmonize the legal
standards between investment advisors"' and broker-dealers1 2 for
consumer protection. The proposed responsibilities of the capital
markets regulator are necessary changes because the current state of
the financial markets no longer allows for the written distinction
between investment advisors and broker-dealers, let alone the
subtleties that allow for a distinction between the governance of the
SEC and CFTC. The use of a capital markets regulator, working in
conjunction with a systemic risk regulator, allows for a specialized
regulatory focus and expertise, thereby increasing efficiency by
removing the overlap in resources and regulatory priorities.1 14
10oSee id. at 5.
u0 See supra text accompanying notes 46-53.
t1 In the ICI Report, "systemic risk regulator" refers to an agency acting to improve the
government's capability to monitor and mitigate risks across the U.S. financial system. See ICI
REFORM, supra note 33, at 3.
0 Id. at 6.
"O Id.
"I Investment advisors are defined by the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 as "any person
who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others . . . as to the value of
securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities . . . ."
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(li) (2006).
Investment advisers have a fiduciary duty with respect to all of their clients and, while the
line between investment advisers and broker-dealers is very tenuous, the SEC continues to try to
find ways to reconcile the subtle differences between investment advisers and broker-dealers.
See, e.g., Elisse B. Walter, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n., Regulating Broker-Dealers
and Investment Advisers: Demarcation or Harmonization?, Speech Before the Mutual Fund
Directors Forum Ninth Annual Policy Conference (May 5, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speechl2009/spch050509ebw.htm). See generally Barbara Black,
Brokers and Advisers-What's in a Name?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31 (2005)
(describing the subtle differences between investment advisers and broker-dealers, as well as
attempts by the SEC to make the delineation clearer for investor purposes).
112The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines broker-dealers in two parts. A broker is
defined as a person "engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the
account of others," and a dealer is "engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for
[its] own account . Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A), (5)(A)
(2006).
"3 ICI REFORM, supra note 33, at i-ii.
"
4 See id. at i.
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Working in conjunction with the capital markets regulator, the
goal of the systemic risk regulator would be to provide "greater
overall stability to the financial system as a whole."' 15 However, the
ICI Report emphasizes that the systemic risk regulator must be
implemented such that it does not impose "undue constraints or
inapposite forms of regulation on normally functioning elements of
the financial system," or stifle innovation, competition, or
efficiency.116
The combined creation of a capital markets regulator and systemic
risk regulator, according to the ICI Report, will not only protect
against regulatory inefficiency and gaps in the present investor
protections, but this dual regulator structure is important because of
the changes in the financial markets-namely, the convergence of the
securities and futures markets. In order to be effective, the capital
markets regulator must combine the scope of authority presently
divided between the SEC and CFTC, as both have the underlying
premise of protecting market users and the public from fraud,
manipulation and abusive practices. 1
2. Benefits of the Regulators
According to the ICI Report, the principal benefits of establishing
a systemic risk regulator and a capital markets regulator are
numerous. First, the proposal improves the government's capability to
monitor and mitigate risks across the financial system.'18 Second, it
creates a regulatory framework that "enhances regulatory efficiency,
limits duplication, and emphasizes the national character of the
financial services industry."ll 9 Third, it closes regulatory gaps to
"ensure appropriate oversight of all market participants and
investment products." 20 Fourth, it preserves "specialized regulatory
focus and expertise and avoid[s] potential uneven attention to
different industries or products."l 2 1 Fifth, it cultivates "consultation
and dialogue among .. . financial regulators to promote collaboration
on issues of common concern." 22 Sixth, it "facilitates coordinated
15 Id. at 4.
16 Id.
"
7 See id. at 6.
"
8 Id. at 3, 15.
11 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
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interaction with regulators in other jurisdictions, including with
regard to risks affecting global capital markets."l2 3
Increased consolidation of financial service regulators, combined
with the establishment of a systemic risk regulator, robust interagency
coordination, and information sharing, would help facilitate
monitoring and mitigation of risks across the entire financial
system.124 In addition, ICI suggests that implementation of a systemic
risk capital markets regulator, in conjunction with such regulatory
consolidation, would increase the competitiveness of the U.S.
financial markets.12 5 International coordination is also more feasible
when there are fewer agencies and individuals to coordinate.126
The final benefit of the ICI Report plan addresses the concerns of
individuals who fear that sector-based regulators prevent full
exposure of the big picture when it comes to the financial markets by
creating a plan that not only provides a full view of the financial
system, but also strengthens "inter-agency coordination and
information sharing." 2 7 The ICI Report maintains that its proposal for
regulation through the combined efforts of a systemic risk regulator
and capital markets regulator actually enables regulators to better
manage the full spectrum of financial markets and helps prevent the
problem of singular regulators gravitating towards a single issue and
dismissing or ignoring the remaining issues that may not seem to be
as urgent. 2 8
3. Responsibilities of the Regulators
According to the ICI Report, the systemic risk regulator has
numerous responsibilities. These include:
(1) monitoring the financial markets broadly; (2) analyzing
changing conditions in domestic and overseas markets;
(3) evaluating the risks of practices as they evolve and
identifying those that are of such nature and extent that they
implicate the health of the financial system at large; and
(4) acting to mitigate such risks in coordination with other
responsible regulators.' 29
123 Id. Chairman Schapiro advocated closing regulatory gaps by making sure the "same
rules apply to the same or similar products and participants." Schapiro Testimony, supra note 6,
at 2. The ICI Report's structure would enable those gaps to be closed.
'
24 ICI REFORM, supra note 33, at 15.
125 See id.
1  See id.
'
27 Id. at 16.
128 See id.
'
29 Id. at 4.
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The capital markets regulator would also have a variety of
responsibilities within the new regulatory framework: (1) setting the
regulatory standards for all registered investment companies;
(2) maintaining explicit authority to regulate where there are presently
gaps, and integrating the legal standards for investment advisers and
broker-dealers; (3) prioritizing investor protections; (4) considering
the impact of rulemaking on factors such as efficiency, competition,
and capital formation; (5) serving as the "first line of defense"
regarding risks across the capital markets; and (6) proactively
working to maximize effectiveness though promotion of industry
dialog, up-to-date monitoring of industry developments, and
utilization of strong analytical capabilities.130
The overall structure of the ICI Report emphasizes the need to
streamline the system and avoid compartmentalizing regulatory
structures and duties, since compartmentalization appears to stifle
coordination and provides for insufficient attention to financial areas
that are not as high profile as others. 13 1 The lack of attention to certain
areas can lead to future systemic risk problems, which is something
the proponents of the ICI Report seek to avoid through their proposed
structure.
D. New Foundation Report
The New Foundation Report is the most recent report, but it
reiterates many of the same concepts introduced by the Treasury
Blueprint, Group of Thirty Framework, and ICI Report. While the
New Foundation Report does not go as far as the previous three
reports in consolidating agencies or changing agency roles, the
purpose of the report is to focus on the essential changes needed to
address the current financial crisis and prevent similar crises in the
future.132
The relevant objectives in the New Foundation Report include:
(1) "[p]romot[ing] robust supervision and regulation of financial
firms;" 33 (2) "[e]stablish[ing] comprehensive supervision of financial
markets;"l 34 (3) "[p]rotect[ing] consumers and investors from
financial abuse;"l 35 (4) "[p]rovid[ing] the government with the tools it
130 Id. at 2.
131 See id. at 16.
132 See TREASURY NEW FOUNDATION, supra note 16, at 4 ("We focus here on what is
essential: to address the causes of the current crisis, to create a more stable financial system that
is fair for consumers, and to help prevent and contain potential crises in the future.").
133 Id. at 3.
3 Id.35Id.
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needs to manage financial crises;" 36 and (5) "[r]ais[ing] international
regulatory standards and improv[ing] international cooperation."l37
With regard to the first goal, the New Foundation Report proposes
an oversight council with the sole purpose of identifying emerging
systemic risks and improving interagency cooperation.' 38 The report
also advocates expanding the authority of the Federal Reserve to
supervise all firms, even if they are not classified as banks that can
threaten the financial stability of the country.'3 9 Such expansion
would place the Federal Reserve in a position to continually analyze
both the connections among major financial firms and the major
financial markets' dependence on those firms in order to track the
potential impact of a failure.140
The present regulation of financial firms is very
compartmentalized,14 1 and the new proposal seeks to improve the
framework and increase supervision so that a single point within the
system remains aware of all that happens. The New Foundation
Report emphasizes that "[d]iffusing responsibility among several
regulators would weaken incentives for effective regulation .... "142 it
also emphasizes that the public has an absolute right to expect that a
"clearly identifiable entity" will set the standards to protect the
financial system and public from the risks of failed entities. 143
The New Foundation Report advocates altering the regulations so
they take into account highly leveraged institutions and the potential
systemic impact upon failure." The report also proposes
consolidating operations among regulatory agencies, since the
fragmentation rampant in the present system generates loopholes that
harm investors. 14 5 The report also brings money market funds under
3
6 Id. at 4.
1371Id.
138 See id. at 3. The New Foundation Report further seeks to provide the government with
the tools necessary to handle the financial crises as they arise. See id. at 4, 76.
139 See id. at 26.
' See id.
141 See id. "The financial crisis has demonstrated that a narrow supervisory focus on the
safety and soundness of individual financial firms can result in a failure to detect and thwart
emerging threats to financial stability that ... have other systemic implications." Id. (emphasis
added).
142 Id. at 22.
13Id.
I Id. at 22, 26.
14 5 See id. at 12. The proposal subjects non-bank financial institutions to "robust,
consolidated supervision and regulation" regardless of their non-affiliation with a bank. Id. at
10. The proposal also recommends that the risk of these non-banking financial institutions be
considered as risk imposed upon the entire system, not just a particular sector. See id. at 10-11.
578 [ Vol. 60:2
BACK IN THE SADDLE AGAIN
the supervisory framework, creating a consolidated and consistent
framework for all financial institutions."'4
To further its goal of comprehensive supervision of the financial
markets, the New Foundation Report proposes enhanced regulation of
securitization markets, including new requirements for market
transparency and stronger regulation of credit agencies.147 The
increased transparency extends to the protection of consumers and
investors from financial abuse. 148 Risk management under the current
regulatory system is unable to keep up with innovation because the
present model does not properly deal with risk distribution. For
instance, securitization and over-the-counter derivatives were both
elements of the financial crisis because risk could not be properly
accounted for under present risk management systems.14 9 The
supervision element is also necessary for credit rating agencies, since
investors are not only overly reliant on the reports from the credit
agencies, but the agencies typically do not fully disclose everything
they should when publishing ratings information, like ratings
methodologies indicating what "the credit ratings are designed to
assess."150
The need to protect consumers led the New Foundation Report to
propose the establishment of a single regulatory agency with the
authority to ensure that "consumer protection regulations are written
fairly and enforced vigorously."' 5 ' Unlike the Treasury Blueprint or
the ICI Report, however, the New Foundation Report increases
authority within existing agencies, and does not focus on
consolidating agencies.152 The systemic risk regulation for the New
Foundation Report appears to be split between the various elements
of the proposal by increasing authority within existing agencies,
adding to the government's arsenal of crisis-related tools, and
1'Id. at 38-39. The New Foundation Report also emphasizes that it would like to see the
regulatory framework around money market funds increased by:
(i) requiring MMFs to maintain substantial liquidity buffers; (ii) reducing the
maximum weighted average maturity of MMF assets; (iii) tightening the credit
concentration limits applicable to MMFs; (iv) improving the credit risk analysis and
management of MMFs; and (v) empowering MMF boards of directors to suspend
redemptions in extraordinary circumstances to protect the interests of fund
shareholders.
Id. at 38.
147 See id. at 3, 44-46.
I" See id. at 45.
149 See id. at 43.
1so Id. at 46.
151 See id. at 7.
i
52 See id. at 63, 70-73 (proposing new authority for the Federal Trade Commission and
the SEC to enhance protection of consumers and investors).
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generally improving regulatory standards. 15 3 However, the New
Foundation Report does not focus on providing overarching
supervision of the financial services market in order to create a single
systemic risk regulator with a comprehensive view of financial
markets and institutions, along with the potential to forecast the
impact of a financial institution's failure.
In order to provide the government with the tools necessary to
effectively manage financial crises, the New Foundation Report
proposes revising the Federal Reserve's emergency lending-also
proposed by the Treasury Blueprint-as well as figuring out how to
deal with the possibility of non-bank financial institutions defaulting
on their obligations and causing systemic failure. 154 The New
Foundation Report also proposes creating a new authority to enable
the government to adequately respond to the potential failure of bank
holding companies or non-bank financial institutions when that
failure could cause instability within the financial system. 155
III. WHERE To Go FROM HERE?
In the four agency report recommendations on dealing with
systemic risk regulation, several coveted a common element:
appointing the Federal Reserve to the position of the systemic risk
regulator. Unfortunately, because of the politics involved, it has
become quite clear in recent months that the Federal Reserve will
likely not take on this role. Although, as an initial matter, it was
suggested that the Federal Reserve become the systemic risk
regulator, unfortunately, as House Financial Services Committee
Chairman Barney Frank noted, "[t]here was a lot of resistance to
[putting the Federal Reserve in that position]."l56 Mr. Frank
essentially put the idea to rest, asserting that ". . . politically, it is clear
that [making the Federal Reserve the systemic risk regulator] is not
going to happen."l 57 With the Federal Reserve out of the race for the
appointed regulator, Frank indicated "lawmakers may be more
enthusiastic about bestowing a council of regulators with the authority
to regulate systemically vital institutions." 58 While such a step does
1 See id. at 3-4.
15 See id. at 26.
'5 See id. at 76-78 (discussing the creation of a new "resolution regime" to address
potential failures of bank holding companies and nonbank financial institutions).
16Ronald D. Orol, Frank: Fed Won't Be Systemic Risk Regulator, MARKETWATCH, July
28, 2009, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/frank-fed-wont-be-systemic-risk-regulator-2009
-07-28-102000 (quoting Barney Frank, Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee).
1571Id.
158d.
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not vest regulatory power in a single regulator as some of the reports
suggested, it could nonetheless help make the collapses and failures
of institutions that plagued the years 2007 to 2009 become a thing of
the past.
In March 2009, the House of Representatives introduced the
Financial System Stabilization and Reform Act of 2009 (the "Reform
Act"),159 and, at present, the bill has been referred to various
committees and is sitting with the Subcommittee on General Farm
Commodities and Risk Management. 60 The Reform Act seemingly
takes its information from the various agency reports. For instance,
the members of the council would include the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the Chairman of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Chairman of the National
Credit Union Administration, the Chairman of the SEC, and the
Chairman of the CFTC.161 The responsibility of this council would
include "review [of] all potential rules, regulations, and regulatory
actions of the Federal financial regulators . . . to determine those
which relate to systemic risk affecting the financial system of the
United States . . . ."162 The Reform Act also provides for unfettered
access to data in order to accurately monitor the potential for systemic
risk,16 3 something each of the above agency reports emphasized as a
vital reform.
With the Reform Act in committee and the agency reports
published and in general circulation, Congress, at this juncture, must
take a close look at the provisions in the various reports, particularly
the Treasury Blueprint and the ICI Report. The Treasury Blueprint
provides a comprehensive look at the system as a whole, outlining the
problems with the existing system, and proceeding to lay out in a
simple fashion wide-ranging means of correcting the enormous
problems facing the entire U.S. financial system. The ICI Report
complements the Treasury Blueprint by focusing on the need for
coordination to be successful. By combining the long-term
objectives-based approach outlined in the Treasury Blueprint and
emphasizing the mission of the ICI Report-protecting consumers
and filling the gaps of the regulations-Congress would have a
159 H.R. 1754, 111th Cong. (2009) (creating "a systemic risk monitor for the financial
system of the United States, to oversee financial regulatory activities of the Federal
Government, and for other purposes").
160 See Open Congress for the 11lth United States Congress, H.R. 1754 - Financial
System Stabilization and Reform Act of 2009, http://www.opencongress.org/bill/11l-hl754/
actionsvotes (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
161 H.R. 1754, § I 11(d).
1621Id. § 112(a)(1)(B).
'
63 See id. § 112(b)(1).
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greater grasp on handling the present financial crisis that continues to
plague this country.'6"
Between the Treasury Blueprint and the ICI Report, and the
language already in place in the Reform Act, there just may be a way
to pull the United States' financial regulatory structure out of the
1930s and put it in a position to compete with today's changing
markets. Congress should attempt to adopt a regulatory structure
similar to the objectives-based approach laid out in the Treasury
Blueprint, as it casts the broadest net and may have the best potential
for preventing a similar financial crisis in the future. While it is
unclear what will happen with the Reform Act, or what will happen
with the agency recommendations, one thing the past few years have
taught us is that something must be done. Otherwise, we will simply
be waiting for history to repeat itself once again.
TRACI M. PRIBBENOWt
A While the New Foundation Report and the Group of Thirty Framework provide helpful
insight, they do not seem to merit the same attention as the ICI Report and Treasury Blueprint.
For starters, the Group of Thirty Framework proposes a consolidated regulatory supervisor, but
as the Treasury Blueprint outlined, the cons of a consolidated system outweigh the pros. See
supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. The New Foundation Report basically reiterates the
most important elements of the Treasury Blueprint and ICI Report while maintaining the focus
on attempting to prevent the financial crisis from happening yet again.
t J.D. Candidate 2010, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Many thanks to
Joel Emans and Thomas Bogle for introducing me to this topic.
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